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ABSTRACT: This paper examines some of the issues and controversies that arise when facilities
with perceived noxious environmental, social, and economic effects (NIMBYs) locate in
communites.  Five specific categories of NIMBYs are examined, including: (1) interstate
highways, (2) large dams, (3) medium and maximum security prisons, (4) commercial nuclear
power plants, and (5) gambling casinos. The paper uses quasi-experimental control group
methods to assess the economic  impacts of these facilities on U.S. counties during the period
1972-94.  The paper shows that few actual negative effects can be attributed to NIMBYs.
However, only interstate highways result in broad based effects that measurably stimulate
aggregate employment.
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21.0  Introduction
One of the biggest headaches in community economic development occurs when  public
campaigns arise to prevent "undesirable" economic facilities from locating in a region.  Planners
recognized this phenomenon decades ago, but only recently graced the objects of this popular outrage
with acronyms: NIMBYs ("Not in my backyard") or LULUs ("Locally unwanted land use") (Popper 1985).
Unfortunately, any attempt to identify what constitutes a LULU or NIMBY is likely to be futile because
they can be so varied.  We know that toxic waste dumps are NIMBYs.  So are nuclear power plants and
prisons.  Transportation facilities such as airports, highways, and rail lines are often regarded as
NIMBYs.  Ditto fun places like shopping plazas, Wal-Marts, Disney theme parks, and sports stadiums.
Even such seemingly innocuous facilities as churches may be regarded as NIMBYs in certain times and
certain places (The Economist).
The NIMBY phenomenon is alive and well in rural America.  However, because many rural areas
continue to lag economically behind the rest of the nation, the opposition there has been somewhat
muted.  Almost nothing has seemed to work in many rural regions or the solutions are perceived to take
too much time.  Therefore, impatient rural communities have sought to improve their fortunes by
recruiting enterprises that were resisted ferociously elsewhere.  In many instances, the facilities are large
and might be thought to create direct employment through new hires and indirect employment through
the associated regional multiplier effects.  It would seem to be an open and shut case.  However,
questions remain about such projects and the size of these tangible benefits.  Moreover, doubts persist
whether they create unacceptable environmental or social externalities which might outweigh the
benefits.
Generalizations are difficult.  Of course, economic multipliers differ predictably from one locale
to another depending on characteristics inherent to the region, including the nature of existing
interindustry and interregional linkages.  The actual impacts of any given enterprise will also differ based
on characteristics of the facility, including the makeup and disbursement of its expenditures.  Therefore,
the actual regional effects must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  Will the new jobs be filled by
local people who live in the area?  Are the linkages with the region strong enough to create substantial
multiplier effects?  Although few NIMBYs are derailed on the basis of this or that calculated multiplier,
they are important considerations
Often, however, the output of economic input-output models seems to be superfluous.
Opponents are willing to concede that the project in question will produce jobs in the short-run. Their
objections are more likely to center on other matters such as the environmental, social, and distributive
effects of the enterprise.  These effects are thought to be so detrimental that they might even undo any
positive effects in the long run.  Opponents often ask hard questions that planners are unable to answer.
Who will be the beneficiaries and the losers?   Will the new jobs be filled by local residents?  Will
disaffected residents such as retirees and tourists leave the area because of the disturbance of their
placid locale?  And, are the noxious qualities of such facilities enough to repel other potential enterprises
from possibly building or expanding in the region?  With increasing attention being paid to the role of
amenities in attracting a skilled laborforce and higher value added businesses, this latter concern has
come to the forefront.  Communities are sometimes reluctant to consider NIMBYs, not only because they
create additional social, safety, or environmental risks, but because of the perception that the
introduction of such risks may ultimately make the region less attractive.
The purpose of this paper is to begin to sort out some of the reasons that NIMBYs are often
unloved and to gauge some limited economic and social effects of representative NIMBY case studies.
Five common NIMBYs are examined:  dams, interstate highways, commercial nuclear power plants,
prisons, and gambling casinos.  These NIMBYs are singled out because of the continuing controversy
surrounding their construction and the slightly different nature of each facility.  In a sense, each
represents a different era in the NIMBY debate.  Large dams made their splash during the 50s and early
60s (see figure 1.1).  Interstate highways construction (figure 1.2) accelerated during the mid 60s and
early 70s.  Nuclear power plants rocketed to prominence during the 70s and mid-80s (figure 1.3).
3Maximum and medium security prison construction stole the spotlight during the late 80s and early 90s
(figure 1.4).  Many communities gambled with casinos during the 90s as dozens of state governments
permitted their  proliferation.
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections.  The next section describes a crude
taxonomy of NIMBYs, and reviews the literature concerned with the economic effects of dams, highways,
nuclear power plants, prisons, and casinos.  The following section describes the quasi-experimental
control group research design used to gauge the effects of these facilities on county growth and
development during the period 1970-94.  The third section describes the sources and characteristics of
important data inputs.  The final section describes the results of the empirical analysis.  The final section
provides a summary and conclusion.
2.0  Literature Review
Citizens don't like NIMBYs and the reasons are often varied.  Indeed, any NIMBY movement is
likely to attract disparate elements who could never get along in another setting or cooperate on another
issue.  A taxonomy of NIMBYs is needed.  It can help to reveal some of the potential friction points and
identify some of important considerations in NIMBY project evaluation.  The taxonomy is crude.  It is not
meant to be exhaustive but rather illustrative.
The fizzlers.  Fizzlers are public projects which create few or no post-construction direct effects, but
instead rely on market forces (which never materialize) to generate the positive regional economic
effects.
The islands.  Islands are economically isolated from their host regions.  They may employ and buy
primarily from outside the region, thereby denying local residents many of the benefits of their physical
presence.
The befoulers.  These enterprises are harmful to the environment or ecology of a region.  They may be
harmful because they emit pollutants into the air or water or dispose of solid waste in the area.  They
might also indirectly befoul the environment by facilitating certain types of growth (e.g., tourism) which in
turn creates environmental spoilage.
The defilers.  These projects may create harmful social effects.  For instance, they may contribute to
decreased family or community cohesion, increased delinquency and crime, alcohol and drug abuse, or
other bad habits
The deniers. These enterprises may negatively impact those who are less fortunate.  They may displace
low-income or elderly residents from their homes or employment.  They also may have disproportionate
effects on minority groups and women.
The competers.  These enterprises may affect the livelihoods of those in the community who are
generally better off.  For instance, established local proprietors may find themselves unable to compete
with aggressive NIMBYs who choose to locate in the region.
The deadbeats.  Deadbeats don't pay the full cost of their infrastructure and public service needs.  They
leave others in the area footing part of the bill.  This situation may arise when NIMBYs receive
substantial relocation subsidies or do not compensate the community for facility externalities that
increase public service expenditures.
The repellers.  These NIMBY enterprises make it tougher for existing or prospective enterprises to
operate in the same region, often because of the negative externalities described above.
4The unknowns.  Unknowns may not have any immediate negative environmental or social effects, but
too little is known about their long-term effects.  They introduce an element of risk into the development
equation that makes many residents and enterprises uncomfortable.
The deserters.  Footloose and fancy-free, the leavers are not committed to a long term community
relationship.  Perhaps, because of the vagaries of the market in which they operate, they respond rapidly
to spatial differences in factor costs.  They represent a risk to the community in which they operate
because of the costs of picking up the pieces.
The disturbers.  These enterprises can destroy a peaceful and quiet ambience by their very presence.
Opponents may prefer no growth at all even if it does ameliorate economic conditions and generate few
negative effects.
Every NIMBY examined here is alleged to have one or more of the attributes described above.
Since each facility is large, huge construction costs are involved at the initial stage.  The construction
stimulus is temporary and rarely serves as the chief selling point for a NIMBY project.  The primary
debates concern the post-construction and, indeed, long-term post-construction effects of the project.
Regarding these effects, there are varying degrees of uncertainty.  Three of the five are direct employers
and, therefore, might be expected to have expansionary effects.  Two of the NIMBYs are public
infrastructure which create little or no direct employment but may be influential in directing private
investment and employment.
Dams are often characterized as befoulers, deniers, and fizzlers.  They can be environmentally
harmful while generating few tangible economic benefits for local residents.  They submerge large areas
of dry land and alter the ecosystem (though they might help to ameliorate some man-made
environmental problems such as erosion), displacing people in the process.  They are often built to serve
national interests and therefore benefits may be very diffuse.  Regional effects are rarely important
motivating considerations.  Indeed, research on the subject of economic effects sends a fairly consistent
message that "water resource developments are likely to be poor tools for accelerating [regional]
economic growth . . . " (Howe 1968, 488; Cox et al. 1971, 37)   When dams do create employment, the
effect is more likely to be connected with recreational uses of the resultant reservoir rather than effects
on transportation or water factor costs that might potentially influence the location of water intensive
manufacturing industries, transportation and public utilities, or agriculture (Knetsch 1964; Cicchetti et al.
1975).  Even when recreation is stimulated, it is unlikely to provide the sort of boost needed for regional
growth and development (Gjesdahl and Drake 1979).
Highways are often regarded by their opponents as befoulers, deniers, competers, fizzlers, and
defilers.  Although almost all interstate highways are constructed along existing traffic corridors, they
sometimes infringe on areas of environmental,  historical, or sentimental value.  They may not directly
create social problems but can serve as a conduit for people who bring social problems (such as crime)
to new areas.  They change access and transportation costs which may create local competitive
advantages as well as disadvantages to a previously isolated community.  Whether or not a highway has
a stimulative effect on a region is influenced by a variety of factors, including urbanization and prior
industrial mix.   Previously more urbanized and centrally located areas are more likely to experience
growth than less urbanized areas, and sectors such as retail trade and services are more responsive than
other sectors (Rephann and Isserman 1994; Briggs 1980; Humphrey and Sell 1975; Lichter and Fuiguitt
1980).  Even in those communities that grow, however, there may be distributive effects: (1) from lesser
urbanized communities along the route and communities by-passed by the route to those in more
urbanized communities and along the route (Rephann and Isserman 1994) and (2) from local ownership
to outside ownership.  The latter could result if, for example,  large corporate entities are quicker to
understand and act upon the advantages and disadvantages created by changes in the transportation
configuration.
Nuclear power plants are islands, repellers, and unknowns.  That is to say, they probably do not
employ many local residents (Bjornstad and Vogt 1984; Lewis 1986) but require trained specialists likely
to be selected from national employment searches.  They represent a risk because of the known hazards
5associated with fission reactors.  Because of the risk, they may deter firms otherwise inclined to locate or
expand in the area.  Peculiarly, regional researchers have found that the negative effects of nuclear
power plants are mitigated by the often huge public revenue effects that result from taxation of the
commercial facilities (Bjornstad and Vogt 1984; Greenberg et al. 1986).  In effect, the enterprise
subsidizes residents and firms, making the communities more attractive candidates for additional private
investment.
Prisons are generally recognized to be a "clean industry."  That is to say, they are not befoulers.
However, many NIMBY opponents argue that they are islands, flagrant defilers, and, to some degree,
repellers (Shichor 1992).  Prisons are owned and operated by state and federal governments.
Consequently, labor is often drawn from state and national searches instead of local searches.  During
the startup phase, much of the management and labor is drawn from other state and federal facilities
(Carlson 1992; Beale 1993).  Because prisons siting is dominated by political considerations, the
eventual sites are unlikely to be low cost producers of many prison inputs (Sechre t 1992).  Therefore,
supply purchasing channels may be national as well.  The positive effects of prisons are, therefore, likely
to result from the household purchases of the relocated workers rather than direct spi offs.  Prisons have
the potential to create social problems because they house residents likely to commit offenses against
one another.  Although this may be isolated from the community at large, imprisoned spouses may serve
as a magnet for families who are more likely to commit crimes than the native population.  Prisons may
alter the safety and prestige of a community, and thereby serve as a deterrent to firm location and
expansion.
Casinos are sometimes characterized as efilers, islands, deniers, competers, and deadbeats
(Goodman 1994).  They have been called islands because of a tendency to draw workers from outside
the immediate community (Rephann et al. 1996).  In a young and competitive industry, they can also
vanish practically overnight, prompting some opponents to call them deserters.  As with any young
enterprise, the success of a casino depends on a variety of locational factors, including proximity to
urban markets, infrastructure, and availability of other tourist attractions (Eadington 1995).  Casino
gambling is held to attract all kind of malicious and perfidious activity (Friedman, Hakim and Weinblatt
1989; Goodman 1994).  It may also tempt residents to gamble excessively. If the persistent gamblers are
disproportionately financially insecure then casino gambling may aggravate poverty, family dissolution,
crime, and other social vices.  New casinos are often opposed by local merchants because of their
deleterious effects ("cannibalization") on home-grown restaurant and entertainment businesses, which
may not be able to compete with the lower prices and product differentiation offered by casinos.   If these
forces act all at once, then a casino can be an expensive proposition because of the social service
expenditures required to redress the newly unemployed and newly addicted.
3.0  Methodology
The quasi-experimental control group method used here is documented carefully in several
published studies, including Isserman and Merrifield (1987), Isserman and Beaumont (1989), and
Rephann and Isserman (1994).  The method chooses a control group of counties similar in economic
makeup to counties which have received a particular treatment.   In the case of NIMBYs, the treatment
would consist of the construction or opening of a NIMBY facility.  The control group of untreated counties
(or counties without such a facility) serve as a benchmark against which to measure the effect of the
treatment.
Since the ultimate goal is to compare the growth rates of NIMBY and non-NIMBY counties, every
effort should be made to control for other plausible causes of economic growth.  For this study, the
determinant variables were drawn from mainstream theories of regional economic growth, including
reduced form equations of regional economic growth described in Richardson (1973) and von Böventer
(1975).  These theories emphasize the role of spatial context, economic dynamism, the cost of labor and
capital, and industrial structure in regional economic growth.  Variables which attempt to measure some
of these concepts are listed in table 3.1. They are used as selection variables in choosing non-casino
county control groups.
6Control counties meet four conditions.  First, they have no corresponding NIMBY facility (e.g.,
the control group for dams must not have counties that have a large dam).  Second, they are sixty miles
distant from a county with such a facility in order to protect against spatial interdependence.  Third, they
do not have an inordinate amount of data gaps caused by data disclosure restrictions.  Fourth, they are
approximately similar to NIMBY counties in industrial structure, spatial position, and demographics in a
period before the facility opened in the study counties.  A similarity measure is computed using the
Mahalanobis metric.  It combines numerous variables in a way to produce a single number that may be
used objectively for comparison purposes.
When a control group has been selected, it should be evaluated further by performing  a
statistical pre-test. The pre-test compares the growth of the NIMBY counties to the control group during a
period before NIMBYs were constructed.  If the control group follows a similar growth path to the NIMBY
counties prior to opening, the control group can be used as a benchmark for assessing the effects.  For
each of the NIMBY groups used in this study, a statistical pre-test is conducted, in effect, by choosing a
base year in advance of the expected impact years which occur after 1971.  For the categories described
here, the years 1970 and 1971 serve as a pretesting period.  As things turn out, there are few statistically
significant discrepancies during this period; therefore, subsequent growth rate differentials may be
reasonably attributed to the NIMBYs themselves.
Economic impacts were measured using data from the Regional Economic Information System
(REIS) (US Dept. Of Commerce, 1996).  The System contains both personal income and employment
data.  The data used here is measured at the sectoral level for both earnings and employment.  These
include sectors such as services, retail trade, and  state and local government.  In addition, the REIS
contains information concerning population, per capita income,  residential adjustment (a measure of net
earnings leakages paid to non-residents), transfer payments (a category consisting largely of social
security and government retiree payments as well as assistance to low income residents), and dividends,
interest, and rent.  The s ctoral abbreviations used in illustrations here are as follows: total employment
(EMP), per capita personal income (PCI), transfer payments income (TRF), residential adjustment
income (RES), construction earnings (CON), transportation, communication, and public utility earnings
(TPU), wholesale trade (WHL), finance, insurance, and real estate earnings (FIR), services earnings
(SVC), federal government earnings (FED), and state and local government earnings (STL).
The basis for impact measurement and tests of statistically significant effects are growth rates
differentials by sector.  Growth rates are measured against a selected base year.  Therefore, for counties
selected in 1969 (the first year in which REIS data is available for this series), 1969 serves as the base
year for all subsequent growth rate calculations, 1970-93.   The years 1970-71 serve as a pre-test period,
during which we can verify that counties followed similar economic trajectories before the treatment was
introduced.  The years 1972-1994 deserve attention as the years that NIMBYs were functional.
The results are presented through a series of graphs displaying the differences between NIMBY
county average growth rates and respective control group average growth rates.  Sectors and years that
are statistically significant at the    = 10% level are identified in the lower left-hand corner of each graph.
The t-test is the underlying statistical test for all grouped comparison tests (see Rephann and Isserman
1994).  The significance test results should be used in interpreting the results.  For example, in figure
5.1, interstate highway counties experienced a 14% increase in employment compared to non interstate
highway counties, while dam counties outgrew non-dam counties by more than 30%.  Only the former
result is statistically significant, however
4.0  Data
The NIMBYs selected for this study were derived from the following sources:
Data regarding dams was obtained from the Federal Emergency Management Agency's National
Inventory of Dams Data (FEMA 1983).  This database contains information about a dam's capacity,
primary usage, location, and construction year.  An effort was made to select only large dams (defined
by the Geological Survey as having a capacity of more than 50,000 acres-feet) because they engender
7greater opposition and might be expected to have larger effects.  There were 881 of large dams out of a
total of 68,225 dams in the U.S.  Counties containing large dam reservoirs were trimmed further on the
basis of  reservoir locations (all study counties had reservoirs located entirely within the county of study),
rurality, uniqueness (only one dam treatment per county during the study period) and dam construction
dates (1972 to 1977). These restrictions narrowed the list to 27 counties.
Highway counties were selected using a file obtained from the Federal Highway Administration
called Status of Improvement of the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways File (PR-511)
(USDOT 1990).  This file contains information on the status of various interstate highway links, including
construction dates and opening dates.  Interstate highways currently run through more then 1,360 out of
the 3,142 counties in the United States.  Out of these approximately 1,360 counties, 58 counties were
chosen for study.  These counties were distinguished by the fact that interst tes measuring at least 9
miles were opened within their borders during the period 1972-75.
Nuclear power plant counties were selected from a list kept by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC 1990).  The list describes each nuclear reactor and the date that a construction permit
was issued and operating license  conferred.  Seventy five counties contain nuclear power plants.  The
study group consists of 29 counties where nuclear reactors were issued construction permits after 1971.
Most of these reactors obtained operating permits during the early and mid 1980s.
A directory published by the American Correctional Association (ACA 1990) was the source of
prison information.  This publication contains a thorough and up-to-date inventory of the nation's state
and federal prisons, including date of opening, number of employees, and number of inmates.  Prisons
are also classified according to their degree of security, with maximum, medium, and minimum security
arrangements being the most common.  This study examines only large sized (250+ inmates) maximum
and medium security prisons.  Two-hundred and ninety-seven counties host such facilities.  The 39
selected for study were opened during the period 1972-80.
  
The data used to select casinos is by far the least satisfactory of the group.  Casino gambling is
not a federally regulated industry, and no responsible authority makes an effort to keep track of when a
casino is built, how large it is, and other parameters that might be of interest in assessing its economic
and social effects.  Therefore, this study relies on a publication compiled for travel agencies and casino
hobbyists called Casino Resort and Riverboat Fun Book Guide, published by Casino Vacations, Inc.  The
1994 Guide describes casinos that were open as of 1993.  There are several drawbacks, however.  The
guide makes no claim as to completeness and, in fact, excludes several levels of gaming operations,
including bingo and pari-mutuel betting.  In addition, the Guide cannot be used to determine the size of
each casino.  Because many Nevada casinos were in existence before the data series used here began,
Nevada casinos were trimmed from the study group.  This left 69 casino counties for the study group.
5.0  Empirical Results
Figures 5.1-5.4 show growth rates differences arranged by sector and NIMBY categories.  The
results for employment and income reveal no evidence of profound detrimental or favorable effects.
Employment growth rate differences are on balance positive but only highways registered a statistically
significant positive total employment effect at the end of the period.  Among the data used, per-capita
personal income provides the closest measure of the average resident's economic well-being.  Though
both dams and casinos exhibited positive effects at the end of the period, only the casinos were
statistically significant.  Four of the NIMBYs had a positive effect on population (highways and prisons
being significant).   Casino counties lagged their control group in population growth, but this had occurred
before casinos were opened.  Indeed, the downward population growth trend had already reversed in
1991, two years after South Dakota legalized limited stakes casino gambling and one year after Colorado
voters approved casino gambling in three old mining towns.  Figure 5.4 shows residential adjustment,
where a positive growth rate difference can be interpreted to mean that net income inflows occurred and
a negative value means net income outflows occurred.  One can imagine that the cash inflows and
outflows are connected to changes in commuting patterns.  In the case of casinos, some of the benefit of
8hosting a casino is diffused outside of the county, perhaps because of the increased presence of
incommuters who work at the casino but reside elsewhere.
All together, the picture presented is a bit of a muddle.  On balance, this evidence runs counter
to the woeful prognostications of the harshest NIMBY critics.  But, neither do the results support the view
that NIMBYs offer any quick route to economic salvation either.  One could argue that casinos have
characteristics of an Island because of the likelihood that outside residents derive some of the benefits of
the new facilities.  However, additional sectoral information is needed to illuminate these cases.
The literature suggests that dams have few economic effects on their host communities.  The
economic benefits are often diffuse and dam reservoirs do not serve as much of an industrial location
asset, even in water intensive industries.  However, dam reservoirs can stimulate recreation related
sectors when they are utilized for recreational purposes.  Nearly every one of the dams used in this study
had a recreational use, and so one might expect some services and retail trade industries to be
stimulated.  The results obtained here lend some credence to this hypothesis.  Retail trade grew 175%
faster (significant at   = 10%) in the dam counties than control group counties.  Included in the retail trade
sector would be eating and drinking places and souvenir vendors.  On the other had, services (which
would include  lodging places and amusement and recreation services) was not affected, and a sector
which would appear to have little connection with the reservoir, wholesale trade, grows significantly
faster.
Highways are a different story (see figure 5.5).  All of the associated effects ar  consistent with
the role attributed to highways of rearranging tertiary sector market areas.  Hence, positive effects are
observed in services (almost statistically significant in 1994), finance, insurance, and real estate, and
wholesale trade.  Population expands as do transfer payments.  On further investigation of transfer
payments income, this effect was revealed to be connected with faster growth in retirement and medical
payments.  One possible explanation for this result is that highways stimulate elderly inmigration,
perhaps because of their more centralized locations and easier access to various public and private
services.  The highway effects are relatively broad based and balanced in comparison with other
NIMBYs examined here, and, as mentioned earlier, they are the only category which produces a
statistically significant effect on total employment.
Nuclear power plants exhibit the greatest effects on the construction, transportation, public
utilities, services, and state and local government sectors (see figure 5.6).  The construction effects
occur, unsurprisingly, during the nuclear reactor construction stage, when the positive and statistically
significant impacts dwarf the size of the original construction sector.  The TPU effects are likely
connected with the direct employment effects of the nuclear power plant.  The state and local
government income effect may stem from the fact that new commercial nuclear power plants are a
major source of local property tax revenue.
The government sectors are among those stimulated by prisons (see figure 5.7).  This is no great
surprise since both state and federal correctional facilities are included in the study group.  These results
likely reflect direct wage disbursements from the government employers.  However, there are three
additional effects worth comment: construction, finance, insurance, and real estate, and transfers.  The
first two effects may reflect a healthier local real estate market.  If a large share of the new employees
are simply transfers from elsewhere, they may have stimulated a small boom in housing construction and
housing sales.  The downside of this result is that few local residents outside the housing sector might
benefit from the situation.  The positive effect on transfers might possibly be connected to expenditures
on prison inmates or their families.  This hypothesis will be studied further using more detailed transfer
income data.
Casinos are a substantial boost to local economies (Rephann et al. 1996), but the effect is
difficult to gauge here because of the relatively poor fit of the control group.  Using a one-size, fits all
approach to selecting the control group meant that the lion's share of the casino stimulus occurs nearly
920 years after control group selection.  During the years preceding, casino counties lagged their control
group because of stagnating state and local government and transportation and public utilities sectors
(see figure 5.8).  Perhaps, such counties selected themselves to host casinos because of their dire
economic and fiscal situation.  Whatever the case may be, the casinos seem to have substantial effects.
However, it is as yet hard to detect any turnaround in the state and local government situation.
Furthermore, the large negative residential adjustment effect reinforces a picture in which casinos are
somewhat isolated from their immediate surroundings.
6.0  Summary and Conclusion
This paper examined some of the issues and concerns that arise when facilities with some
noxious qualities locate in a region.  Although these facilities often create substantial direct employment,
they are resisted for a variety of reasons, including concerns that the facility will be detrimental to other
enterprises, certain categories of residents, prospective new employers, or local public finances.  There
are also concerns that the facilities will be of little benefit to the host region, and instead benefit
disproportionately outsiders who may not experience the negative effects associated with the facilities.
Through examining five representative case studies that been resisted by the public during the last four
decades (dams, highways, nuclear power plants, and prisons, casinos), this paper is able to establish that
NIMBYs are neither as bad as their opponents insist nor as good as some proponents claim.
Using the categories described earlier, however, it is possible to describe some economic
aspects of these NIMBYs.  Casinos are islands.  They have few economic effects beyond the services
sector and distribute part of the earnings stimulus outside the county.  Because they apparently do little
to reinvigorate state and local government disbursements, they are likely to be deadbeats.  Prisons have
features of islands too because their primary effects are directly connected to the state and federal
sectors.  However, there may be some residual effects derived from the relocation of a sizeable chunk of
employees into the area.  Nuclear power plants are hard to characterize as islands because of effects in
the construction and services sectors.  They are also not deadbeats because they appear to contribute
generously  to the public coffers.  Highways and dams alone act by influencing the lo ational decisions of
firms and residents.  Highways appear to be the more effective of the two strategies because of the
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Table 3.1  Control Group Selection Variables
Industrial Structure
Farm earnings hare*, 1969
Manufacturing earnings share*, 1969
Federal government, civilian and military earnings share*, 1969
Population, demand, and spatial aspects
Log of population (base ten), 1969
Logarithm of population potential for counties within 60 miles, 1969
Logarithm of population potential for 60-500 mile radius from the counties, 1969
Residential adjustment share*, 1969
Transfer income share*, 1969
Per capita personal income, 1969
Distance to city of population 25,000 or greater, 1970
Distance to city of population 100,000 or greater, 1970
* Share of total personal income.
Data sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (1996); U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Census (1979, 1980)
